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Abstract 
The paper presents a novel multi-level hierarchical approach which models the oligopolistic and competitive behavior of 
carriers and their relationships in maritime freight transportation networks. With the merger of the carriers' industry and some 
dominant carriers in a shipping market, the carrier competition frequently exhibits an oligopolistic nature. Three types of 
carriers are considered herein; ocean carriers, land carriers and port terminal operators. The oligopolistic ocean carriers, land 
carriers and port terminal operators compete with each other in their pricing and routing decisions, respectively. The carriers 
determine service charges and delivery routes at different parts of the multimodal freight network, having hierarchical 
interactions. In a game theoretic approach, ocean carriers are regarded as the leaders in an oligopoly shipping market. Port 
terminal operators are the followers of ocean carriers as well as the leaders of land carriers. For the individual carrier 
problems, Nash equilibrium is used to find the optimal decisions for which each carrier obtains the greatest profit. A three-
level model is formulated to capture the interactions among different types of carriers. A numerical example is presented to 
demonstrate the validity and capability of the model. 
 
© 2012 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Program Committee. 
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1. Introduction 
Ocean carriers, land carriers and port terminal operators provide transportation services in maritime freight 
transportation networks. Port terminal operators, providing transportation services within a port complex, are 
regarded as a special type of the carrier. Ocean carriers typically transport freight between ports via waterways; 
port terminal operators handle freight within their port complex; and land carriers deliver freight from port 
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terminals to inland destinations. The three types of carriers make decisions on prices and delivery routes (or port 
services) at different parts of the multimodal freight network, having hierarchical interactions. 
The top 10 ocean carriers deliver 57.7% of the world maritime shipment. In particular, the three big ocean 
carriers of APM-Maersk, Mediterranean Shg Co and CMA CGM Group transported 33.5% (AXS-Alphaliner, 
2009), showing relatively significant market shares. These companies cover most of the primary maritime routes 
and port terminals over the world.  On the other hand, many ocean transportation firms have been engaged in 
global alliances (i.e., Grand Alliance (GA) and New World Alliance (NWA)). With the dominant ocean carriers 
and the merger of the carriers' industry (Luberoff, 2000), the carrier competition exhibits an oligopolistic nature, 
while an infinite number of firms lead to perfect competition. 
Similar market trends could be applied to port terminal operators and land carriers. Most ports consist of 
several port terminals, generally managed by private terminal operators. The port terminal operators cooperate to 
promote service efficiencies if their competition causes suboptimal facility utilization and increased congestion. 
The cooperating companies may increase their dominance in a competitive region, having certain power in 
setting the price instead of being simply price takers. This market condition is considered to be oligopoly. 
Similarly, land carriers may collaborate to reduce costs and unproductive trips in local transport operations and 
possibly create some powerful transportation firms that manipulate the market to their own advantage. 
Research efforts to consider distinctive roles of different types of carriers and their relationships has been quite 
limited, with the majority of relevant articles focusing on the type of carrier problems. Most models in the 
literature have captured interactions between shippers and ocean carriers or port terminal operators, assuming the 
behavior of the other carriers is known. Particularly, the oligopolistic competitive behavior of the carriers has 
been rarely analyzed despite real world trends. This paper aims to formulate a predictive network model that 
captures the interactions among three types of carriers in an oligopoly shipping market. The model focuses on the 
behavior of the carriers in setting their service charges and routes.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section presents an up-to-date literature review of the 
existing models that predict maritime freight movements. The third section defines the research problem with 
network structures and modeling approaches. The fourth section formulates individual carrier models and a three-
level model. The fifth section develops a solution algorithm. The sixth section deploys a numerical example to 
demonstrate the applicability of the model. The last section concludes the paper and suggests directions for future 
research. 
2. Literature Review 
Freight network models predict freight movements by capturing the behavior and relationship of key 
stakeholders, representing the transportation network explicitly. The three common modeling methodologies of 
freight network equilibrium models, spatial price equilibrium models and integrated network equilibrium models 
(Harker, 1985; Crainic, 2002; Valsaraj, 2008) have been extensively used in the freight modeling literature. In 
addition, Nash equilibrium models and compensation principle models have been used to formulate alternative 
stakeholder behavior and decision making process (Wang, 2001; Zhang, 2008). Harker (1985) presents a 
comprehensive summary of research in this field up to 1985. Therefore, the paper reviews models that have been 
formulated over the two and a half decades.  
Most former models captured the simultaneous and sequential interactions of shippers or/and carriers in the 
intercity freight transport system (Fang & Peterson, 1980; Florian & Los, 1982; Harker, 1983; Friesz et al., 1983; 
Freisz et al., 1984; Pang, 1984; Harker et al., 1986a; Harker et al., 1986b; Harker et al., 1986c; Dafermos & 
Narguney, 1987; Harker, 1988; Guelat et al., 1990; Miller et al., 1991; Hurley & Petersen, 1994; Fernandez et al., 
2003; Agrawal & Ziliaskopoulos, 2006; Cheng, 2006; Yang et al., 2007; Xu & Holguin-Veras, 2009). On the 
other hand, Xiao and Yang (2007) initially attempted to find game theoretical relationships among three 
stakeholder groups including one shipper, and multiple carriers and infrastructure companies.  
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The models frequently used the three modeling approaches briefly mentioned above, freight network 
equilibrium (Harker, 1988; Guelat et al., 1990; Hurley & Petersen, 1994; Fernandez et al., 2003; Agrawal & 
Ziliaskopoulos, 2006; Cheng, 2006; Xiao & Yang, 2007), spatial price equilibrium (Fang & Peterson, 1980; 
Florian & Los, 1982; Friesz et al., 1983; Freisz et al., 1984; Pang, 1984; Dafermos & Narguney, 1987; Xu & 
Holguin-Veras, 2009) and integrated network equilibrium (Harker, 1983; Harker et al., 1986a; Harker et al., 
1986b; Harker et al., 1986c).  Miller et al. (1991) and Yang et al. (2007) applied the concept of Stackelberg game 
to analyze the multiple and sequential behavior of stakeholders on freight networks. 
According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS, 2009), the world maritime shipment grew rapidly 
and significantly between 1995 and 2008, showing an increase of 182.1%. These led to several publications on 
international maritime freight transportation in the 2000s (Wang, 2001; Zhang et al., 2008; Kuroda et al., 2005; 
Zan, 1999; Min & Guo, 2010; Dimitriou & Stathopoulos; 2011). The studies formulated models capturing 
sequential interactions between shippers and ocean carriers or port terminal operators, assuming decisions of the 
other carriers are given. User equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, spatial price equilibrium and compensation 
principle were used for the individual stakeholder problems. For multi-level games, Stackelberg game or multi-
leader-follower game was applied depending on the number of leaders.  
Most relevant articles have considered perfectly competitive markets where all non-cooperative players have 
the same market share. On the other hand, Weskamp (1985) and Dafermos (1987) studied the production and 
distribution behavior of oligopolistic shippers in spatially separated markets via Cournot-Nash oligopolistic 
equilibrium. Miller et al. (1991) presented the spatial Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot competitive network equilibrium 
problem. One of the oligopolists, the Stackelberg firm was assumed to be the leader firm in making production 
and shipping decisions. The leader expects the reactions of the other firms in the oligopolistic industry. Nagurney 
(1999) formulated a spatial oligopoly model capturing supply-side of the transportation service and facility on the 
general transportation network. Wang (2001) presented the oligopolistic carriers’ pricing and routing problem 
subject to shippers’ spatial price equilibrium.  
Few studies have perceived distinctive roles of different types of carries and their relationships fully in the 
multimodal freight transportation system. This paper formulates a three-level model capturing interactions among 
ocean carriers, land carriers and port terminal operators using multi-level optimization programming. The model 
reflects the oligopolistic market of the carriers in an international maritime transport setting. 
3. Problem Definition 
3.1. Network Structure 
Fig. 1 depicts a multimodal network including the ocean carrier network, land carrier network and port 
terminal network. The network shows actual transportation routes and modes in the maritime freight 
transportation system. Nodes represent origins, destinations and intermediate points for changes in types of 
services, modes or routes. Links express alternative routes between the nodes. The ocean carrier network has port 
links to access port terminals on the water side and the land carrier network has port links to access port terminals 
on the land side. Each port terminal has the port sub-network which shows both physical locations and types of 
port services such as loading, unloading, moving and storing freight. 
3.2. Modeling Assumptions 
Basic assumptions for the definiteness and simplicity of modeling are presented as follows: 
1. No movement of land carriers to reach a port is considered, since commodities are assumed to be 
produced near the departure port terminal. 
2. Ocean carriers choose a port terminal of the alternative ones located within a region. 
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3. For port determinants, the port location and service charge are defined with an assumption that other port 
service conditions are similar.  
4. Oligopolistic and competitive carriers have independent operations, respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Carrier Network (Lee et al., 2011) 
3.3. Modeling Approaches 
The behavior of oligopolistic carriers is formulated at each level using Nash equilibrium to find the optimal 
service charge and routing pattern for which each carrier obtains the greatest profit in the competitive 
environment. Interactions among the different types of carriers are captured in a three-level model. At the first 
level, oligopolistic ocean carriers aim to maximize individual profits. Each ocean carrier determines the profit 
based upon the ocean carrier service demand function and the ocean transportation cost function. At the second 
level, oligopolistic port terminal operators attempt to maximize individual profits. Each port terminal operator 
decides the profit from the port throughput function and the port service cost function. At the third level, 
oligopolistic land carriers aim to maximize individual profits. Each land carrier determines the profit based on the 
land carrier service demand function and the land transportation cost function.   
Hierarchical interactions occur between ocean carriers and port terminal operators, and port terminal operators 
and land carriers, respectively. At the upper level interaction, port service charges affect ocean carriers’ routes, 
while port throughputs are influenced by the routing decisions. Ocean carriers choose a port terminal of the 
alternative ones, considering the transportation network as well as port determinants such as the port location and 
service charge. At the lower level interaction, land carrier service demands are determined from the port 
throughputs. 
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4. Mathematical Formulation 
Nomenclature 
Indices 
O set of ocean carriers  P set of port terminal operators L set of land carriers  
I       set of ocean carrier origins J set of port terminal origins K  set of land carrier origins 
J set of ocean carrier destinations K      set of port terminal destinations W
        
  set of land carrier destinations 
IJ       set of ocean carrier O-D pairs JK     set of port O-D pairs  KW
 
     set of land carrier O-D pairs 
LK
-o     set of ocean links LK-p    set of port links LK-l     set of land links 
PH
-o     set of ocean paths PH-p   set of port paths PH-l    set of land paths 
o ocean carrier (o O) p port terminal operator (p P)      l land carrier (l L)    
i        ocean carrier origin (i I)   j port terminal origin (j J
 
)        k
 
   land carrier origin (k K)          
j  ocean carrier destination ( J)      k
 
       port terminal destination (k K)          w
         
  land carrier destination (w W)            
ij
 
       ocean carrier O-D pair (ij IJ)      jk
 
       port terminal O-D pair (jk JK)          kw
 
      land carrier O-D pair (kw KW)           
lk
-o       ocean link (lk_o LK_o)    lk-p      port link (lk_p LK_p)          lk-l       land link (lk_l LK_l)              
ph
-o      ocean path (ph_o PH_o)      ph-p     port path (ph_p PH_p)            ph-l      land path (ph_l PH_l)                
Data and Parameters 
ijwQ  transportation demand from i via j to w ovot  value of time of ocean carrier o 
pvot   value of time of port terminal operator p lvot   value of time of land carrier l 
Variables 
o
ijc
   service charge of ocean carrier o between i
 
and j 
o
ijc
−
 service charges of other ocean carriers except ocean carrier o between i
 
and j 
o
ijf
 
flow of ocean carrier o between i
 
and j 
_ ,ph o o
ijf
 
flow of ocean carrier o on the ocean path ph
-o connecting O-D pair ij 
_ph o
ijf  flow on the ocean path ph-o connecting O-D pair ij 
_lk of
 
flow on the ocean link lk
-o 
_ , _lk o ph o
ijζ  1, if  the ocean link lk-o is on the ocean path ph-o: otherwise 0 
_ ,ph o pψ  1, if the ocean path ph
-o is connected to port terminal operator p: otherwise 0 
pb    service charge of port terminal operator p  
pb −    service charges of other port terminal operators except port terminal operator p 
ph    flow of port terminal operator p  
_ph p
jkh  flow on the port path ph-p connecting pair O-D jk 
_lk ph  flow on the port link  
_ , _lk p ph p
jkϕ  1, if the port link lk-p is on the port path ph-p: otherwise 0   
l
kwe
   service charge of land carrier l between k
 
and w 
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l
kwe
−
  
 
service charges of other land carriers except land carrier l between k
 
and w 
_ ,ph l l
kwr
 
flow of ocean carrier l on the land path ph
-l connecting O-D pair kw 
Functions 
o
ijU   profit function of ocean carrier o between i
 
and j  
o
ijI   revenue function of ocean carrier o between i
 
and j 
o
ijD  service demand function of ocean carrier o between i
 
and j 
o
ijTC
 
transportation cost function of ocean carrier o between i
 
and j 
_ph o
ijTC
 
transportation cost function on the ocean path ph
-o connecting O-D pair ij 
_lk oTC
 
transportation cost function on the ocean link lk
-o 
_lk oAOC
 
average operating cost function on the ocean link lk
-o 
_lk oATT
 
average travel (shift) time function on the ocean link lk
-o 
_ ,ph o o
ijMC
 
marginal transportation function of ocean carrier o on the ocean path ph
-o connecting O-D pair ij  
pU
 
profit function of port terminal operator p  
pI   revenue function of port terminal operator p 
pG
 
port throughput function of port terminal operator p 
pSC   port service cost function of port terminal operator p 
_ph p
jkSC  service cost function on the port path ph-p connecting O-D pair jk 
_lk pSC
 
service cost function on the port link lk
-p 
_lk pASC
 
average service cost function on the port link lk
-p 
_lk pAST
 
average service time function on the port link lk
-p  
l
kwU  profit function of  land carrier l between k and w 
l
kwI   revenue function of land carrier l between k and w  
l
kwD  service demand function of  land carrier l between k and w 
l
kwTC
 
transportation cost function of  the land carrier l between k
 
and w 
 
 
A Nash game has been frequently used to formulate the non-cooperative behavior of the oligopolistic players. 
This study utilizes a modeling methodology of VI (variational inequality) based on the Nagurney’s (1999) 
theorem 6.1.  
Theorem 6.1 (Variational Inequality Formulation of Nash Equilibrium) 
Under the assumption that ui is continuously differentiable on k and concave with respect to xi, x* is a Nash 
equilibrium if and only if  x *  X is a solution of the variational inequality. 
                                                                  ( *), * 0,F x x x− ≥
     
x  K                                                             (1) 
where 
1 1( ) ( ( ),..., ( ))x xm mF x u x u x= −∇ −∇ , and is assumed to be a row vector.  
4.1. Ocean carrier problem 
4.1.1 Equilibrium condition  
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Nash Equilibrium is used to find the optimal service charge and routing pattern for which each ocean carrier 
obtains the greatest profit. No ocean carrier can get better profit by changing its decisions unilaterally at 
equilibrium.  
 
                                         
( *, *, *) ( , *, )o o o o o o o oij ij ij ij ij ij ij ijU c c f U c c f− −≥            o O, ij IJ                                         (2)    
       
4.1.2 Objective function 
The objective of ocean carrier o is to maximize the profit ( o
ijU ) by maximizing the revenue ( oijI ) and 
minimizing the transportation cost ( oijTC ) for O-D pair ij.  
                               
_ ,
_ , _ , _ ,
_ ,
( , )* ( )
PH o o
o o o o o ph o o ph o o ph o o
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
ph o o
U D c c c AC f f−= − ×¦          o O, ij IJ                             (3)           
                                      
4.1.3 Assumptions for the objective function 
The service demand function of ocean carrier o ( o
ijD ) is assumed to be strictly monotonically decreasing in the 
service charge ( o
ijc ). 
                                                          
0 1
o o
ij ijD cα α= − ×             o O, ij IJ                                                       (4) 
The ocean path transportation cost function ( _ph o
ijTC ) is a linear combination of a) the sum of ocean link 
transportation cost functions ( _lk oTC ) if the ocean link (lk
_o) is on the path (ph_o) and b) the sum of port service 
charges ( pc ) if the ocean path (ph
_o) is connected to port terminal operator p.  
             
_
_ _ _ , _ _ _ _ , _
_
( ) ( )
LK o
ph o ph o lk o ph o lk o lk o ph o p p ph o
ij ij ij ij ij
lk o
TC f TC f c fζ ψ= × + × ×¦
  
      ij IJ, ph
_o PH_o, p P              (5) 
The ocean link transportation cost function ( _lk oTC ) consists of a) the average ocean link operating cost 
function ( _lk oAOC ) and b) the average ocean link travel (shift) time function ( _lk oATT ). These cost functions are 
assumed to be strictly monotonically increasing in the flow. The average link cost and time functions of ocean 
carrier o _ ,( lk o oAOC , _ , )lk o oATT are defined by the player o’s behavior. 
                    
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _( ) ( ) ( )lk o lk o lk o lk o lk o o lk o lk o lk oTC f AOC f f vot ATT f f= × + × ×
 
        lk
_o LK_o                             (6) 
4.1.4 Properties of the objective function 
Since Hessian matrix (second derivatives of the objective function) is negative definite, the objective function 
is strictly concave in _ ,( , ).o ph o oij ijc f  
                                  2
_ , _ ,
( , ) 0( )    
0 ( )
o o o
c ij ij ijo
ij ph o o ph o o
f ij ij
D c c
U
MC f
−ª º∇
∇ = « »
−∇« »¬ ¼
   
 o O, ij IJ                                     (7)
           
4.1.5 Feasible region of the objective function 
The feasible region of the ocean carrier objective function (OFR) is defined by linear equality and non-
negativity constrains. 
                                               
_ ,
_ ,
_ ,
PH o oW O O
o ph o o
ijw ij ij
w o o ph o o
Q D f= =¦ ¦ ¦ ¦           ij IJ                                                (8) 
                                                    
o o o
ij ij ijSc c Bc< <
            
 o O, ij IJ                                                              (9) 
                                           
_ ,
, 0o ph o oij ijc f ≥              o O, ij IJ, ph_o,o PH_o,o                                                 (10) 
Eq. (8) ensures that the total transportation demand from i via j to w is equivalent to the sum of individual 
ocean carrier service demands as well as the sum of ocean carrier flows on all used paths between i and j. These 
linear equality constrains define a closed and convex feasible region. Eq. (9) ensures that the ocean transportation 
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service charge ranges from a small number to a large number. Eq. (10) states non-negativity of the ocean carrier 
service charge and flow.  
4.1.6 Mathematical formulation 
An ocean carrier VI model is formulated based on the objective function properties and OFR. Oligopolistic 
ocean carrier o finds the optimal service charge and routing pattern. Each ocean carrier exhibits a system 
equilibrium-like behavior to minimize the total cost of the vessels belonging to it. 
                   
( )( *, *)( *) ( *)( *) 0O IJ o o o o o o o o oc ij ij ij ij ij f ij ij ij ij
o ij
D c c c c TC f f f−∇ − − ∇ − ≥¦¦
        
 ( , )o oij ijc f  OFR                 
 
(11) 
4.1.7 Existence and uniqueness of the solution  
Eq. (11) is continuous and linear equality constraints of OFR define a closed convex feasible region. The 
formulation is strictly monotone in ( , )o oij ijc f based on the concave properties of the objective function. Therefore, 
the existence and uniqueness of the solution are demonstrated applying Nargurney’s (1999) theorems 1.4 ~ 1.6. 
4.2. Port Terminal Operator Problem 
4.2.1 Equilibrium Condition 
Nash equilibrium is also used to find the optimal port service charge and pattern for which each port terminal 
operator obtains the greatest profit.  
                                               
( *, *, *) ( , *, )p p p p p p p pU b b h U b b h− −≥          p P                                            (12)    
    
4.2.2 Objective Function     
The objective of port terminal operator p is to maximize the profit ( pU ) by maximizing the port revenue ( pI ) 
and minimizing the port service cost ( pSC ).  
 
                                    
_
_ _ _
_
( , ) ( )
PH pJK
p p p p p ph p ph p ph p
jk jk jk
jk ph p
U G b b b AC h h−= × − ×¦ ¦         p P                                  (13)        
                                                                                     
4.2.3 Assumptions for the Objective Function 
The port throughput function of port terminal operator p ( pG ) is assumed to be strictly monotonically 
decreasing in the port service charge ( pb ).  
                                                          
0 1
p pG bβ β= − ×
           
 p P
                                                        
(14) 
The port path service cost function ( _ph pjkSC ) is the sum of port link service cost functions ( _lk pSC ) if the port 
link (lk
_p) is on the path (ph_p).  
                               
_
_ _ _ , _ _ _
_
( ) ( )
LK p
ph p ph p lk p ph p lk p lk p
jk jk jk
lK p
SC h SC hϕ= ×¦
       
 jk JK, ph
_p PH_p
                                
(15) 
The port link service cost function ( _lk pSC ) comprises a) the average port link service cost function ( _lk pASC ) 
and b) the average port link service time function ( _lk pAST ). These functions are assumed to be strictly 
monotonically increasing in the flow. 
                   
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _( ) ( ) ( )lk p lk p lk p lk p lk p p lk p lk p lk pSC h ASC h h vot AST h h= × + × ×
  
 lk
_p LK_p                     (16)
 
4.2.4 Feasible Region of the Objective Function 
The feasible region of the port terminal operator objective function (PFR) is as follows. 

_ _
_ , _ _
_ _
PH o PH pIJ
ph o p ph o p ph p
ij ij jk
ij ph o ph p
f G hψ = =¦ ¦ ¦

 p P, jk JK

(17) 
                                                                     
p p pSb b Bb< <
           
 p P                                                       (18) 
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,
pb
 
_ 0ph pjkh ≥            p P, jk JK, ph_p PH_p                                                (19) 
Eq. (17) ensures that the total amount of freight transported via ocean paths is equivalent to the throughputs of 
the port terminal operator p if ocean paths are connected to the port terminal. Also, the throughput is equivalent 
to the sum of port flows on all used paths in a port complex. Eq. (18) ensures that the port service charge ranges 
from a small number to a large number. Eq. (19) states non-negativity of the port service charge and flow. 
4.2.5 Mathematical Formulation 
A port terminal operator VI model is formulated based on the objective function properties and PFR. 
                     
( )( *, *)( *) ( *)( *) 0P p p p p p p p p pb h
p
G b b b b SC h h h−∇ − −∇ − ≥¦
         
 ( , )p pb h  PFR                   (20) 
4.3. Land Carrier Problem 
The equilibrium condition and objective function are similarly expressed with the ocean carrier problem. The 
feasible region of the land carrier objective functions (LFR) is defined below. 
                                              
_
_
_
PH pJ L W
ph p l
jk kw
j ph p l w
h D=¦ ¦ ¦¦
        
 jk JK, kw KW
                          
                  (21) 
                                                      
_ ,
_ ,
_ ,
PH l lL L
l ph l l
kw kw
l l ph l l
D r=¦ ¦ ¦        kw KW
                                                        
(22) 
                                                    
l l l
kw kw kwSe e Be< <
           
 l L, kw KW                                                        (23) 
                                           
 
_ ,
, 0l ph l lkw kwe r ≥           l L, kw KW, ph-l,l PH-l,l                                                    (24) 
Eq. (21) ensures that the total amount of freight treated at k is equivalent to the sum of land carrier service 
demands departing from k. Eq. (22) ensures that the total land carrier service demand for O-D pair kw is 
equivalent to the sum of land flows on all used land paths between k and w. Eq. (23) ensures that the land 
transportation service charge ranges from a small number to a large number. Eq. (24) states non-negativity of the 
land carrier service charge and flow.  
A land carrier VI model is formulated in Eq. (25). 
                    
( )( *, *)( *) ( *)( *) 0L KW l l l l l l l l le kw kw kw kw kw r kw kw kw kw
l kw
D e e e e TC r r r−∇ − −∇ − ≥¦¦
         
 ( , )l lkw kwe r  LFR               
 
(25)
     
4.4. Three-level model 
A three-level model is formulated to capture hierarchical interactions among the three types of carriers in the 
oligopolistic and competitive carrier environment. The vector form is shown below. 
       
( )( *, *) ( *) ( *) ( *) 0To o o o o o T o oc fD c c c c TC f f f−∇ − − ∇ − ≥
         
 ( , )o oc f  OFR                          (26)
             
s.t.  
                   ( )( *, *) ( *) ( *) ( *) 0Tp p p p p p T p pb hG b b b b SC h h h−∇ − − ∇ − ≥
        
 ( , )p pb h  PFR
              
(27)
             
                   s.t. 
                         
( )( *, *) ( *) ( *) ( *) 0Tl l l l l l T l le rD e e e e TC r r r−∇ − − ∇ − ≥
          
 ( , )l le r
 
 LFR            (28) 
5. Solution Algorithm 
Algorithms to solve the three-level model are developed as follows. 
Ocean carrier problem 
1089 Hyangsook Lee et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  54 ( 2012 )  1080 – 1094 
Step  0: Define the initial ocean carrier service charge 0 1 2, , ...,o o o omij ij ij ijc c c c=  and flow 
0 _ 1, 0 _ 2, 0 _ , 0 _ ,
... ... ,
o ph o o ph o o ph on o ph on om
ij ij ij ij ijf f f f f= + + + + +  for O-D pair ij. Let g denote the order of ocean 
carrier o and u denote the order of ocean path ph
-o. Let v and z denote the order of the iteration, each. 
Set g:=1, u:=1, v:=1, z:=1. 1σ
 
and 2σ are preset tolerances. 
Step  1: Denote mg as the carrier with its order in the set m being g. Determine o
ijc
 
for gth ocean carrier with
 
, 1o o v
ij ijc c
− − −
= .  
Step  2: Determine _ ,ph o o
ijf  for u
th
 ocean path of gth ocean carrier. Then, decide the next ocean path flow by 
setting u:=u+1 until u<n. If _ 1, _ 1, 1
1,
ph o z ph o z
ij ijf f σ−− < _ 2, _ 2, 1 1ph o z ph o zij ijf f σ−− <
 
,…, 
_ , _ , 1
1
ph on z ph on z
ij ijf f σ−− < , stop and go to Step 3; otherwise, z:=z+1 and repeat Step 2. 
Step  3: Solve the next ocean carrier problem via Step 1 and Step 2 by setting g:=g+1 until g<m. 
Step  4: If profit differences of ocean carriers are smaller than 2σ , stop and denote solutions as ( *, *)g gij ijc f ; 
otherwise, set v:= v +1 and turn to Step 1. 
Port terminal problem 
Step  0: Define the initial port terminal operator service charge 0 1 2, ,...,p p p pmb b b b=  and flow 
0 _ 1, 0 _ 2, 0 _ , 0 _ ,
... ... .
p ph p p ph p p ph pn p ph pn pmh h h h h= + + + + +  Let g denote the order of port terminal operator p and 
u denote the order of port path ph
-p. Let v and z denote the order of the iteration, each. Set g:=1, u:=1, 
v:=1, z:=1. 3σ
 
is a preset tolerance. 
Step  1: Determine pb
 
for gth port terminal operator with
 
, 1p p vb b− − −= .  
Step  2: If ocean carriers choose pb , stop and denote solutions as ( *)gb ; otherwise, set v:= v +1 and turn to Step 
1. 
Step  3: Determine _ph ph  for uth port path of gth port terminal operator, with the determined port throughputs by 
the ocean carriers’ routing decisions. Then, decide the next port path flow by setting u:=u+1 until u<n. 
If _1, _1, 1
3,
ph z ph zh h σ−− < _ 2, _ 2, 1 3
ph z ph zh h σ−− <
 
,…, 
_ , _ , 1
3
ph n z ph n zh h σ−− < , stop and denote solutions as 
( *)gh ;   otherwise, z:=z+1 and repeat Step 3. 
Step  4: Solve the next port terminal operator problem via Steps 1 ~ 3 by setting g:=g+1 until g<m. 
Land carrier problem 
Step  0: Define the initial land carrier service charge 0 1 2, , ...,l l l lmkw kw kw kwe e e e=  and flow  
0 _ 1, 0 _ 2, 0 _ , 0 _ ,
... ... ,
o ph l l ph l l ph ln l ph ln lm
kw kw kw kw kwr r r r r= + + + + +  for O-D pair kw. Let g denote the order of land carrier 
l and u denote the order of land path ph
-l. Let v and z denote the order of the iteration, each. Set g:=1, 
u:=1, v:=1, z:=1. 5σ
 
and 6σ are preset tolerances. 
Step  1: Determine lkwe
 
for gth land carrier with
 
, 1l l v
kw kwe e
− − −
= , for the port throughput of each port terminal. 
Step  2: Determine _ ,ph l lkwr  for u
th
 land path of gth land carrier. Then, decide the next land path flow by setting 
u:=u+1 until u<n. If _ 1, _ 1, 1
5 ,
ph l z ph l z
kw kwr r σ
−
− < _ 2, _ 2, 1 5
ph l z ph l z
kw kwr r σ
−
− < ,…, _ , _ , 1 5
ph ln z ph ln z
kw kwr r σ
−
− < , stop and 
go to Step 3; otherwise, z:=z+1 and repeat Step 2. 
Step  3: Solve the next land carrier problem via Step 1 and Step 2 by setting g:=g+1 until g<m. 
Step  4: If profit differences of land carriers are smaller than 6σ , stop and denote solutions as ( *, *)g gkw kwe r ; 
otherwise, set v:= v +1 and turn to Step 1. 
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6. Numerical Example 
A multimodal freight network is tested to show the application and capability of the model. The solution 
algorithms are implemented in MATLAB and executed on a PC with Pentium IV 2.00 GHz CPU (4.00 GB of 
RAM). The carrier network includes 18 nodes (i1, j1, j2, k1, k2, x1~x12, w1), 8 ocean links (lk_o1~lk_o8), 11 
port links (lk_p1~lk_p11) and 10 land links (lk_l1~lk_1l0). Ocean carriers have an O-D pair including 2 
alternative sets of (i1, j1) and (i1, j2). Each port terminal has an O-D pair of (j1, k1) and (j2, k2). Land carriers 
have 2 O-D pairs of (k1, w1) and (k2, w1). 950 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent units) are assumed to be 
transported from an origin and a destination during a time period. 4 oligopolistic ocean carrier companies having 
the capacity ranging from 210 TEUs to 300 TEUs deliver containers via 8 waterways. The ocean transportation 
service charge is determined between $800 and $900 per a unit of freight. The port service charge ranges from 
$300 to $400 in each port terminal. 4 and 3 oligopolistic land carriers having the capacity ranging from 100 to 
300 transport containers for 2 O-D pairs of (k1, w1) and (k2, w1), respectively. Land transportation service charge 
ranges from $250 to $320.  Table A.1~ Table A.5 in the Appendix shows parameters in the functions. Table 1 
shows the ocean carrier revenue, transportation cost and profit under the competitive game.  
Table 1. Ocean Carrier Profit under the Competitive Game 
Ocean carrier o Revenue ($) Transportation cost ($) Profit ($) 
Ocean carrier 1 244,800 169,192 75,608 
Ocean carrier 2 207,000 141,890 65,110 
Ocean carrier 3 198,000 135,470 62,530 
Ocean carrier 4 189,000 129,078 59,922 
 
Each ocean carrier minimizes the total transportation cost through a system equilibrium-like behavior. Hence, 
the marginal transportation cost to deliver a unit of freight via any ocean path is equivalent. Table 2 illustrates the 
flow and the marginal and total transportation costs of ocean carrier 1 as a sample. The marginal transportation 
cost is estimated at $616 on the ocean link.  
Table 2. Flow and Transportation Cost of Ocean carrier 1 
Path Link Flow (TEUs) Marginal cost ($) Total cost ($) 
ph_
 o1,o1 lk_o1,o1 ĺ  lk_o9,o1 36 616 22,278 
ph_
 o2,o1 lk_o2,o1 ĺ  lk_o9,o1 19 616 12,065 
ph_
 o3,o1 lk_o3,o1 ĺ  lk_o9,o1 45 616 27,841 
ph_
 o4,o1 lk_o4,o1 ĺ  lk_o9,o1 28 616 17,659 
ph_
 o5,o1 lk_o5,o1 ĺ  lk_o10,o1 48 616 29,294 
ph_
 o6,o1 lk_o6,o1 ĺ  lk_o10,o1 35 616 21,498 
ph_
 o7,o1 lk_o7,o1 ĺ  lk_o10,o1 32 616 20,104 
ph_
 o8,o1 lk_o8,o1 ĺ  lk_o10,o1 29 616 18,453 
Total 272 616 169,192 
 
Table 3 shows the port terminal operator revenue, service cost and profit under the competitive game, 
according to the ocean carrier competitive game. With the port throughputs determined by ocean carrier routings, 
port terminal operators attempt to minimize port service costs in their port terminals.  
Table 3. Port Terminal Operator Profit under the Competitive Game 
Port terminal operator Revenue ($) Service cost  ($) Profit ($) 
Port terminal operator 1 133,221 99,003 34,218 
Port terminal operator 2 146,379 113,418 32,961 
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The marginal port service cost to handle a unit of freight via any port path in a port terminal is equivalent. 
Table 4 illustrates the flow and the marginal and total service costs of port terminal operator 1. The flow of port 
terminal operator 1 is determined when the marginal port service cost is $240 on the port link.  
Table 4. Flow and Service Cost of Port Terminal Operator 1 
Path Link Throughput (TEUs) Marginal cost ($) Total cost ($) 
ph_p1 lk_p1ĺ  lk_p2 220 240 48,493 
ph_p2 lk_p1 ĺ  lk_p4 ĺ  lk_p6 94 240 22,213 
ph_p3 lk_p3 ĺ  lk_p4 ĺ  lk_p6 130 240 28,297 
Total 444 - 99,003 
 
 
The land carrier service demands for O-D pairs of (k1, w1) and (k2, w1) are determined from the port 
throughputs of port terminal operator 1 and 2, respectively. Table 5 shows the land carrier revenue, transportation 
cost and profit under the competitive game, according to the competitive games of ocean carriers and port 
terminal operators.  
Table 5. Land Carrier Profit under the Competitive Game 
 Land carrier O-D Revenue ($) Transportation cost ($) Profit ($) 
k1 - w1 44,400 23,652 20,748 
k2 - w1 39,040 29,418 9,622 
 
Table 6 shows the flow and the marginal and total transportation costs of land carrier 1, for an O-D pair of 
(k1, w1). The marginal transportation cost is determined at $197 on the land link. 
Table 6. Flow and Transportation Cost of Land Carrier 1 
Path Link Flow (TEUs) Marginal cost ($)  Total cost ($) 
ph_
 l1,l lk_l1,l  ĺ  lk_l4,l ĺ  lk_l5,l 46 197 8,763 
ph_
 l2,l lk_l1,l  ĺ  lk_l4,l ĺ  lk_l6,l 30 197 6,016 
ph_
 l3,l lk_l1,l  ĺ  lk_l4,l ĺ  lk_l7,l 46 197 8,873 
Total  122 - 23,652 
Conclusions 
The paper formulated a three-level model which captures interactions among oligopolistic ocean carriers, land 
carriers and port terminal operators in maritime freight transportation networks by a multi-level optimization 
programming. The carrier competition frequently exhibits an oligopolistic nature due to dominant carriers and the 
merger of the carriers' industry. Therefore, this research provides a useful tool to examine and understand the 
dynamics and the decision-making processes of various stakeholders involved in the oligopolistic freight 
shipping market.  
The developed model can be extended to a more comprehensive model including decisions of other key 
stakeholders such as shippers and pubic bodies (i.e., Port Authorities) and interactions among them. Also, a 
monopolistic market or a collusive environment of carriers through alliances may be considered in future studies. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 Parameters in the Ocean Carrier Demand Function  
0α
 
1α
 
251 0.02 
Table A.2 Parameters in the Transpiration Cost Function of Ocean Carrier o 
2
_ _
_ _
1 2
_ _
( )
lk o lk o
lk o lk o
o lk o lk o
f fAOC f
cap cap
ω ω ω
§ · § ·
= + +¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹ © ¹
 
1
_
_ _ _ _
0
_
( ) 1
lk o
lk o lk o lk o lk o
lk o
fATT f att ast
cap
μ
μ
§ ·§ ·¨ ¸= + + ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹© ¹
 
Link oω
 
1ω  2ω  att (day) ast  (day) 0μ  1μ  Capacity 
lk_o1,o 180 2.2 - 17.8 - - - 50 
lk_o2,o 185 2.2 - 17.1 - - - 50 
lk_o3,o 184 2.3 - 16.8 - - - 50 
lk_o4o 188 2.8 - 16.2 - - - 50 
lk_o5,o 183 3.2 - 16.3 - - - 50 
lk_o6,o 186 2.6 - 16.2 - - - 50 
lk_o7,o 182 2.4 - 17.1 - - - 50 
lk_o8,o 184 2.2 - 16.8 - - - 50 
lk_o9,o 28 3.5 2.5 - 0.3 3.8 2 200 
lk_o10,o 32 3.3 2.4 - 0.2 3.8 2 200 
Table A.3 Parameters in the Average Port Service Cost Function 
2
_ _
_ _
1 2
_ _
( )
lk p lk p
lk p lk p
o lk p lk p
f fASC f
cap cap
π π π
§ · § ·
= + +¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹ © ¹
 
1
_
_ _ _
_
( ) 1
lk p
lk p lk p lk p
o lk p
fAST f ast
cap
ν
ν
§ ·§ ·¨ ¸= + ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹© ¹
 
Link oπ  1π  2π  ast (hour) 0ν  1ν  Capacity 
lk_p1 78 2.7 0.85 4.5 1.2 2 400 
lk_p2 102 2.1 0.78 3.8 2.2 2 400 
lk_p3 68 3.1 0.65 4.2 2.1 2 300 
lk_p4 26 2.3 0.55 8.0 1.7 2 300 
lk_p5 56 1.4 0.58 3.8 2.3 2 300 
lk_p6 52 1.7 0.74 2.8 1.6 2 300 
Table A.4 Parameters in the Land Carrier Demand Function 
Land carrier O-D 0λ  1λ  
k1 - w1 163 0.05 
k2 - w1 141 0.06 
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Table A.5 Parameters in the Transportation Cost Function of Land carrier l 
2
_ _
_ _
1 2
_ _
( )
lk l lk l
lk l lk l
o lk l lk l
f fAOC f
cap cap
τ τ τ
§ · § ·
= + +¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹ © ¹
 
1 3
_ _
_ _ _ _
0 2
_ _
( ) 1 1
lk l lk l
lk l lk l lk l lk l
lk l lk l
f fATT f ast att
cap cap
θ θ
θ θ
§ · § ·§ · § ·¨ ¸ ¨ ¸= + + +¨ ¸ ¨ ¸¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹ © ¹© ¹ © ¹
 
Link oτ
 
1τ  2τ  att (day) ast  (day) 0θ  0θ  2θ  3θ  Capacity 
lk_l1,l 35 1.23 0.54 4.2 - 1.2 2 - - 300 
lk_l4,l 71 1.36 0.72 - 5.4 - - 1.8 2 150 
lk_l5,l 62 1.29 0.76 - 7.6 - - 1.6 2 150 
lk_l6,l 38 1.08 0.55 3.7 - 3.2 2 - - 200 
lk_l7,l 124 1.32 0.62 - 7.8 - - 3.4 2 100 
 
 
